Introduction
International organisations such as WTO, the OECD1 or the APEC2 are increasingly demanding the harmonisation of regional norms3. Especially the TBT Agreement (Technical Barriers to Trade) of 1994 pronounces the necessity of harmonisation. As a result, a growing number of norms are initiated by international organisations and formulated by the ISO (International Organisation for Standardisation). Moreover, the international dispute settlement procedures equip the WTO with considerable authority as far as breaches of conformity to norms, i.e. breaches of internationally established regulations, and corresponding sanctions are concerned. It is clear that such activities provide support for a model of policy centralisation. However, such a policy overlooks a very important aspect: norms are not automatically implemented. On the contrary, the receiver – an enterprise in a specific country – attaches its own particular significance to the standard according to various incentives and its own particular perception of the norm, with the result that there is a large amount of deviation from the norm in reality. In this contribution it can not be discussed, which harmonised norms are, from a normative point of view, desirable. The contribution starts from the point that different rationalities toward the necessity of a norm exist, that there are cases in which harmonisation may be necessary and that in these cases non-compliance can be a problem. Especially against the background that self-regulation is an ongoing political demand, it has to be discussed which preconditions have to be fulfilled that self-regulations are complied with…